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Contract Without Privity:
Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance
Andrea K. Bjorklund*
In the case of an investment dispute, Chapter 11 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") permits investors from one NAFTA Party to submit
to arbitration a claim against the sovereign government of another NAFTA Party.
This type of arrangement in which a sovereign entity sets forth terms to which any
potential claimant must accede in order for an agreement to be made is sometimes
termed "arbitration without privity." Yet despite a lack of privity in negotiating the
agreement, the parties to an arbitration still have an "arbitral contract: Chapter 11 is
best viewed as a NAFTA Partys unilateral offer to arbitrate a specified set of claims
(Section A) according to specified procedures (Section B). Arbitral tribunals will best
serve NAFTA Parties and their investors by strictly adhering to the requirements set
forth in Chapter 11.
Claimants frequently argue that enforcing the Chapter's terms literally is
contrary to NAFTA's goal of investment expansion. Closer examination, however,
reveals not only that such strict construction of the terms is required by international
law, but also that such a construction would be more likely to achieve the goal of
"increas[ing] substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties:'
First, the NAFTA Parties waived their sovereign immunity from suit on the
conditions set forth in Chapter 11. NAFTA was the product of extensive negotiation
among the three Parties; arbitral tribunals lack the authority to rewrite that agreement
by modifying the Chapter's terms. Effectively, investors may not counter-offer but
must accept the terms set forth by the State Parties. Second, the Chapter's guidelines
ease and facilitate investment by being clearly workable and predictable for all
interested parties.

• Attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State The views
expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 ILM 605, Art 102(1)(c) (1992).
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Enhancing investors' ability to recover for breaches of Chapter 11 is often treated
as the unwritten subtext of the goals set forth in Article 102 of Chapter One. For
example, the tribunal in Metaiclad Corp v United Mexican States' cited Article 102 as the
source for an "underlying" objective of NAFTA "to promote and increase crossborder investment opportunities and ensure the successful implementation of investment
initiatives."3 The italicized language is not in Article 102, and in fact, it is nowhere in
NAFTA. Though it is possible to read the Preamble's exhortation to "ensure a
predictable commercial framework for business planning and investment," in
conjunction with the language that isin Article 102, to bolster what might be termed a
"pro-investor" conclusion, this requires, as shown above, importing nonexistent
language in the agreement. Accordingly, a more reasonable construction is that
Chapter 11 is but one part of an overarching agreement that, as a whole, has helped to
increase investment opportunities in the territories of the State Parties. Chapter 1l's
mere existence may allay the fears of some investors wary of relying on whatever
redress is available in a foreign land. Furthermore, the predictable framework referred
to by the Preamble should benefit both State Parties and NAFTA investors.
An important additional consideration, however, is that the Parties did not agree
to unfettered liability for investors' setbacks. As the tribunal noted in Azinian v United
Mexican States,4 "It is a fact of life everywhere that individuals may be disappointed in
their dealings with public authorities. . . .NAFTA was not intended to provide
foreign investors with blanket protection from this kind of disappointment, and
nothing in its terms so provides."5
Furthermore, each of the State Parties wore two hats when negotiating
NAFTA. They negotiated the terms not only as potential defendants in Chapter 11
cases but also as representatives for their nationals who would be claimants in those
cases against other State Parties. This construction reveals an inherent tension;
investors may always want more access than State Parties are willing to provide in
their notorious reluctance to give up their sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, when
placed in historical context, Chapter 11 is a sizable step beyond the regimes to which
State Parties have hitherto agreed. Recognizing this progress should help to reconcile
investors and tribunals to the Chapter's limitations. Construing it properly will help
ensure its existence and may facilitate similar dispute settlement provisions in other
free trade agreements. Construing Chapter 11 to reach beyond the Parties' intentions,
however, could dampen governments' enthusiasm for investor-State dispute
settlement.
I

MetalciadCorp v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (Aug 30, 2000) (on
file with the Chicago Journal of International Law).
3 Id at para 75 (emphasis added).
4. Azinian v United Mexican States, 39 ILM 537 (2000).
5. Id at 549.
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The historical context of NAFTA's investor-State dispute settlement chapter
emphasizes the advances in the regime garnered by investors and supports tribunals'
strictly adhering to Chapter Mls requirements. Critics often describe Chapter 11 as
granting unprecedented rights to private investors vis-.-vis sovereign governments.
This characterization is somewhat exaggerated-NAFTA Chapter 11 is arguably the
latest step in a continuum that dares from at least the mixed claims commissions

established in the latter 19th and early 20th centuries and extends through the
bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") that came into favor in the 1980s. However,
progress from agreements establishing mixed claims commissions has been slow at
best and nearly stalled completely after World War II, when the vast majority of
international claim dispute mechanisms were lump-sum settlement agreements.
The early claims commissions treaties differed from NAFTA Chapter 11 in
important ways. First, these commissions were generally established to resolve a
limited universe of claims arising from incidents that had already occurred. They
therefore covered a finite, albeit possibly unidentified, set of potential claimants.
While such definition does not preclude wrangling over certain claims or claimants at
the margin that may or may not fall within an agreement's scope, the circumscription
is nevertheless much more than in the Chapter 11 or BIT context. By contrast,
Chapter 11 is forward-looking and by its terms does not apply to measures occurring
before NAFTA's entry in force. Second, Chapter 11 applies to "investment
disputes"-a more open-ended category than claims commissions established to settle
all claims arising from certain incidents or sets of incidents, such as acts of piracy on
the high seas. Third, most of these early claims commissions still required States to
espouse investors claims. This traditional screening mechanism, which required a
government to present claims, remained to protect sovereigns from marginal or
politically dicey claims. Chapter 11, on the other hand, permits investors to challenge
State Parties directly, without diplomatic intervention. Fourth, the claims
commissions generally used standing tribunals or permanent umpires, which might be
thought to lead to greater consistency in decisionmaldng and facility in comparing the
merits of different claims. By contrast, Chapter 11 tribunals are ad hoc.
Nevertheless, despite these differences, cases decided by those claims
commissions are important as primary sources developing the international law of
claims. Without these decisions there would be a dearth of case-law authority as to
the international law obligations of NAFTA State Parties under Chapter 11, which
requires treatment "in accordance with international law."7 For that reason, those
decisions are commonly referred to in NAFTA cases.

6. See generally, Burns H. Weston, Richard B. Lillich and David J. Bederman, Intu:naitum. Cinms: "TnSettlement by Lump Sumn Agrenents 1975-1995 (Transnational 1999).
7. 32 ILM at 639 (cited in note 1).
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More recent and more closely analogous precursors to Chapter 11 are BITs.
Relatively few cases have been brought under the North American BITs, though
ascertaining numbers is difficult given that some disputes are kept confidential. There
is, therefore, little BIT precedent despite the similarity of some BIT provisions to the
parallel NAFTA provisions. The greater number of cases brought under NAFTA to
date, coupled with the relatively higher rate of cross-border investment among the
three NAFTA parties than between most BIT partners, suggest that more cases will
be decided in that context than in the BIT context.
Chapter 11, therefore, represents an important advance in the settlement of
international claims. Its terms, however, are still limited. Chapter 11 permits an
investor of one NAFTA Party with an investment in another NAFTA Party to bring
a claim directly against that NAFTA Party on its own behalf or on behalf of its
investment when measures adopted or maintained by that Party violate Section A of
Chapter 11 and thereby cause injury. However, Chapter 11 need not, and should not,
be read to mean that any NAFTA investor can recoup the losses it suffered in any
investment deal gone awry by resorting to NAFTA dispute settlement.
On the issues raised in the cases brought to date, the State Parties have argued
consistently for strict interpretation of Chapter l1's terms. As of November 2000,
eleven cases had been brought under Chapter 11, four each against Canada and
Mexico, and three against the United States.' The respondent State Party has raised
jurisdictional objections of some kind in all of the ten cases that have progressed
beyond initial stages. Those objections have fallen roughly into two categories:
objections to procedure, for example, alleged failures to meet the requirements set out
in Section B of Chapter 11; and objections to substance, for example, allegations that
the claim itself falls outside the scope of the chapter.
Again as of November 2000, tribunals have issued full or partial decisions in six
of those cases. These decisions are not binding precedent on other NAFTA
tribunals,9 but may be viewed as persuasive authority by subsequent tribunals. It is too
early to draw conclusions from this relative paucity of arbitral decisions. To date,
however, only the tribunal in Waste Management, Inc v United Mexican States"' has
dismissed a case on jurisdictional grounds while the other tribunals that have issued
decisions have rejected jurisdictional challenges.
A sampling ofjurisdictional arguments from five of the decided cases follows, as
space constraints prohibit a thorough analysis of every jurisdictional argument raised

8. This number includes only those cases in which tribunals have been constituted.
9. 32 ILM at 646 (cited in note 1).
10. Waste Management,Inc v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/2, Arbitral Award

(June 2, 2000), available online at <htp://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/waste-award.pdf>
(visited Mar 25, 2001).
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in every case."' Recurring themes include challenges to the waiver required by Article
1121, allegations that the challenged measure related to trade rather than investment,
and allegations that claimants did not comply with the time periods set forth in
Section B.
In Waste Management, Mexico challenged the validity of the waiver filed by the
investor pursuant to Article 1121, which requires that claimants "waive their right to
initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any
Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the
measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach . . . "' Waste
Management had filed a waiver reiterating the language in Article 1121 but adding
language stating that the waiver did not apply to any dispute settlement proceedings
alleging that Mexico had violated duties imposed under other sources of law,
including the municipal law of Mexico.3 The company further noted that it intended
to comply with Article 1121's requirements."' The panel majority found that Waste
Management's concurrent pursuit of redress in local courts evidenced an intent at
odds with the waiver's requirements." Accordingly, the tribunal held that the
additional language "failed to translate as the effective abdication of rights mandated

by the waiver." 6
In Ethyl Corp v Canada, Canada raised several jurisdictional arguments, both
substantive and procedural.' 7Ethyl Corporation had claimed that it would be injured
by Canadian legislative action that banned the interprovincial trade or import of the

gasoline additive methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl ("MMT"). The case
also featured a challenge to the waiver as Canada argued that Ethyl Canada's waiver
was insufficient because it was not filed with the Notice of Arbitration but later, with
the Statement of Claim. Canada also contended that the claim fell outside the scope
of Section A of Chapter 11, arguing that the measure at issue, a legislative bill, was not
yet a measure adopted or maintained by a Party because it had not yet received royal
assent at the time Ethyl filed its NAFTA claim. As a corollary, Canada argued that

11. In the sixth case. Azinian v United Mexican States (cited in note 4), Mexico objected to the standing of two of
the shareholders. Because there were other qualified shareholders, the objection would not have dispoed of
the case in its entirety and the Azinian tribunal chose not to address those questions preliminarily.
12. 32 ILM at 643 (cited in note 1).
13. Waste Management at para 5 (cited in note 10).
14. Id ar para 6.
15. Id at para 30.
16. Id at para 31. But see Waste Managanent,Inc v United Mexican States, ICSID Case no Arb(AF)/93/2, Dissenting Opinion Uune 2, 2000) available online at
<http://www.worldbanorg/icsid/cases/wastecdi-pdf> (visited Mar 25, 2001) (finding %,aiverto be effective on date offered, and therefore sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the tribunal). Waste Management
has reifiled its case; ICSID registered the new case on Sept 27, 2000.
17. Ethyl Corp v Canada, 38 ILM 708,718, paras 43,45 (1999).
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Ethyl's Statement of Claim, which was filed after the Act had received royal assent,
was impermissible because the Act itself had not been referred to in the Notice of
Arbitration and was not properly before the tribunal. Canada also claimed that Ethyl
had failed to comply with the procedural requirement that an investor wait six months
from the event giving rise to a breach before submitting a claim. Canada argued
further that the measure related to trade in goods, rather than to investment, and was
therefore not the type of measure that fell within the purview of Chapter 11.
The Ethyl tribunal dismissed these jurisdictional objections. It held that even if
the MMT Act affected trade in goods and was covered under Chapter 3 of NAFTA,
it could be covered under Chapter 11 as well."8 The tribunal gave short shrift to
Canada's timeliness argument, noting that by the time the Claimant had submitted its
Notice of Arbitration, the bill had passed the Senate and awaited only royal assent,
which would be forthcoming as a matter of course. 9 Finally, lumping together what it
termed "procedural objections," the Ethyl tribunal concluded that NAFTA's goals of
increasing investment opportunities and creating effective procedures for the
resolution of disputes did not comport with overly strict readings of the procedural
requirements and that the Parties did not intend that those conditions must be
fulfilled in order for a tribunal's jurisdiction to attach."
Canada withdrew its ban on interprovincial trade after a panel convened under
the Agreement on Internal Trade found the MMT Act to be inconsistent with that
Agreement." Contrary to some popular media reports, the Ethyl tribunal did not cause
Canada to reverse the ban. NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunals may only give relief in the
form of monetary damages and applicable interest; they may also order restitution of
property so long as they provide that the disputing Party may pay damages and
interest in lieu of restitution.' Canada did settle the NAFTA case after the panel
rendered its decision, though the fact that the ban violated the Agreement on Internal
Trade does not necessarily mean it violated international law.
Canada made two similar jurisdictional arguments in Pope & Talbot, Inc v Canada,
a case challenging Canada's implementation of the Softwood Lumber Agreement
("SLA"). 23 First, Canada argued that the dispute in question was not an investment
dispute because the SLA and its implementation are not measures relating to
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id at 725.
Id at 725-6.
Id at 727-30.
Internal Trade Secretariat, Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning a Dispute between Alberta
and Canada Regarding the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act, File No 97/98-15-MMT-P058
(June 12, 1998), available online at <hrtp://www.intrasec.mb.ca/eng/0798/mmt.pdf> (visited Mar
25, 2001). Ethyl Corp also challenged the constitutionality of the ban in municipal court, but the
case never progressed beyond preliminary stages.
22. 32 ILM at 646 (cited in note 1).
23. Pope & Talbot, Inc v Government of Canada,Interim Award Uune 26, 2000) (on file with the Chicago
Journal of International Law).
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investment, but are rather measures relating to trade in goods that fall outside the
scope of Chapter 11. Like the Ethyl tribunal, that tribunal determined that NAFTA
contained "no provisions to the express effect that investment and trade in goods are
to be treated as wholly divorced from each other,"4 and further found "the fact that a
measure may primarily be concerned with trade in goods does not necessarily mean
that it does not also relate to investment or investors.
Second, Canada argued that Pope & Talbot had failed to file with its notice of
arbitration a waiver from an investment on whose behalf it was submitting a claim, as
required by Article 1121(b). By the time it did file the requisite waiver, Canada
argued, the three-year period within which an investor may submit a claim under
NAFTA had run. The tribunal rejected both arguments, noting the Etbyl award's
statement that a constructive waiver by the investor might be said to accompany the
initiation of arbitral proceedings. It held that the waiver in Article 1121, which
preserves an investor's right to seek injunctive and similar relief, should be viewed as
working to the benefit of the investor, and that failure to execute such a waiver would
only disadvantage the investor."' The tribunal concluded that "there would be no good
reason to make the execution of the investor's waiver a precondition of a valid claim
for arbitration."
In SD Myers, Inc v Canada,Canada again raised its argument that the measure in
question, a ban on the export of PCB waste for disposal, was not a measure relating to
investment because it dealt with trade in goods.2a The SD Myers tribunal dismissed
that argument, citing the Pope & Talbot tribunal in accepting the view that "different
chapters of the NAFTA can overlap and that the rights it provides can be cumulative
except in cases of conflict."9 Canada also argued that SD Myers lacked standing to
bring a claim under Chapter 11 because Myers Canada, the Canadian enterprise in
question, was not owned or controlled directly or indirectly by SD Myers, Inc, but
was owned directly by the four shareholders of SD Myers, Inc. The SD Myers tribunal
dismissed that argument, noting its reluctance to believe that "an otherwise
meritorious claim should fail solely by reason of the corporate structure adopted by a
claimant in order to organize the way in which it conducts its business affairs.""

24. Pope & Talbot, Inc v Canada,Award on Motion to Dismiss, para 26 (Feb 24, 2000) (on file with the
Chicago Journal of International Law).
25. Id at para 33.
26. Pope & Talbot, Inc v Canada,Award in Relation to Preliminary Motion by Government of Canda to
Strike Paragraphs 34 and 103 of the Statement of Claim from the Record (the "Harmac Motion),
para 16 (Feb 24, 2000) (on file with the Chicago Journal of International Law).
27. Id.
28. SD Myers, Inc v Canada,Partial Award, para 236 (Nov 13, 2000) (on file with the Chicago Journal of
International Law).
29. Id at para 294.
30. Id at para 229.
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In Metaclad, Mexico argued that one of the measures at issue, an ecological
decree preventing any development on land on which Metalclad had sought to develop
a hazardous waste disposal facility, postdated the notice of arbitration." Mexico
argued that Metalclad had not fulfilled the requirements of Section B of Chapter 11
because it had not provided a notice of intent to arbitrate with respect to that claim,
and because six months had not elapsed between the events giving rise to the claim
and its submission. 2 The Tribunal rejected this argument, noting that the applicable
arbitral rules permitted additional or incidental claims that fall within the scope of the
arbitration agreement of the parties."
This article is not the place for a detailed analysis of the merit (or lack thereof) of
the Chapter 11 tribunal decisions to date. On a global basis, it is too early to draw
firm conclusions from these few decisions. It is, however, difficult to avoid a
preliminary judgment that Chapter 11 tribunals have been, and may continue to be,
loath to accept jurisdictional objections. Tribunals should reconsider their reluctance
to credit what may seem like picayune insistence that compliance with the terms of
Section B is required. The State Parties consented to the submission of claims to
arbitration "in accordance with the procedures set out in this Agreement." 4 Those
procedural requirements are fairly easily identified and fairly easily met. Moreover, a
tribunal's jurisdiction depends on compliance with those procedures, since those are
the terms on which the State Parties consented to waive their immunity and submit
to arbitration. Thus, requiring that investors meet those conditions ought to be
viewed as essential to the lawful invocation ofjurisdiction by Chapter 11 tribunals.
Determining whether a dispute falls within the scope of the Chapter 11 is more
difficult. Certainly measures taken by a country may relate to more than just
investment, and may also affect trade, or transportation, or any number of things.
State Parties should not be able to avoid their Chapter 11 obligations on the basis of
nomenclature alone. On the other hand, while virtually any government measure may
be viewed as relating to investment within its borders in some sense by virtue of the
ripple effect that most government measures have throughout an economy, it is
untenable to suggest that the NAFTA State Parties intended to extend an
unbounded offer to arbitrate disputes arising from any regulatory or other measure
taken by the state.

31.

Metalclad at para 64 (cited in note 2).

32.
33.

Id.
Id at paras 66-69. Mexico has petitioned the Supreme Court of British Columbia to set aside the
Metalclad award on the grounds, inter alia, that the Metaklad tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction by
deciding matters of municipal law that should have been referred to Mexican courts. See Amended
Petition to the Court at para 72(a), United Mexican States v Metalciad Corporation,Vancouver Reg No
L002904 (B C Sup Ct) (filed Nov 14,2000) (on file with the Chicago Journal of International Law).

34. 32 ILM at 643 (cited in note 1).
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State Parties are likely to continue urging narrow construction of the Chapter,
and arejustified in so doing. Such an offer, whose terms were agreed to by three State
Parties with the goal of protecting their own investors as well as protecting their flscs,
may only be accepted on its terms. There is little to no room for modification without
renegotiating the agreement." Abiding by that restriction does not mean that the
goals of Chapter 11 or of NAFTA more broadly will be frustrated. To the contrary,
judicious construction of both the procedural and substantive requirements of
Chapter 11 will ensure that it survives to inform the next generation of dispute
settlement agreements.

35.

32 ILM at 645 (cited in note 1) (This allows the Free Trade Commission, comprising trade ministers of
the three Parties, to issue a bindinginterpretation" of provisions of Chapter 11. That article does nor
speak to how modifications might be effected.)
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